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Abstract. We provide a partial characterization of the set of
outcome functions that can be supported as Bayesian equilibrium
in the recommendation game described in Yamashita (Economet-
rica 2010). Despite the fact that communication is private in Ya-
mashita’s game, set of outcome functions that can be supported is
eﬀectively as large as the set supportable by a mechanism designer.
In particular, we show how to support random and correlated out-
comes, and illustrate how to ensure that the information used by
diﬀerent principals is consistent.
Many outcome functions can typically be supported as equilibria in
competing mechanism games. Some of these outcomes look quite ’col-
lusive’. The reason for this is that competing mechanism games often
provide players the opportunity to make what they do conditional on
what other players do. This allows players to support collusive out-
comes by writing contracts that commit them to react whenever an
opponent deviates from a putative equilibrium outcome. A complete
characterization of supportable outcomes is provided in Peters (2010).
Part of this characterization is the description of a reciprocal contract-
ing game that can be used to support any (feasible) outcome.
Since the set of supportable outcome functions is large, it is natural
to search for alternative extensive form contracting games in which
players ability to commit or to communicate is restricted. One such
contracting game was proposed by Yamashita (2010), The logic of his
game is straightforward. Each principal commits to a mechanism that
simply asks agents what it should do. If the majority of the agents’
recommendations agree, the principal commits himself to carry out the
recommendation.
Then, to support a particular outcome function as an equilibrium,
principals oﬀer recommendation mechanisms, and on the equilibrium
path, agents unanimously recommend that each principal carry out
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1his part of the agreement. Should any principal deviate and try to
oﬀer something other than a recommendation mechanism, the agents
unanimously recommend that the others punish the deviator. The
reason the agents are willing to do this is because they expect all the
other agents to do it, and believe they will be ignored if they don’t do
likewise.
One reason that Yamashita’s recommendation game is interesting is
that players communicate their type reports privately. It is interest-
ing to ask whether this restriction might limit the set of outcomes that
would otherwise be supported as equilibrium. What is perhaps surpris-
ing about our result, is that private communication imposes essentially
no restrictions on the set of supportable outcomes.
There are a number of reasons we need to write a paper on this
instead of referring to Yamashita. First of all, though he explains per-
fectly well how competing mechanisms can be used to support multiple
outcomes, he doesn’t provide an explicit theorem characterizing the
things that are supportable. Characterization isn’t really the point of
his paper. When he describes what a characterization might look like,
he describes a ’value’ that imposes a lower bound on principals’ payoﬀs
from supportable outcomes. This ’value’ is the lowest payoﬀ that the
principal attains from any mechanism he can oﬀer in any continuation
equilibrium against any array of mechanisms of the other players. Since
the calculation of these values basically requires the calculation of all
equilibrium strategy rules, the ’characterization’ is really nothing more
than a restatement of the deﬁnition of equilibrium. So our primary
objective in this paper is to turn this argument into a representation
that can be used to compare his result to the rest of the literature.
One of the diﬃculties that arise in doing this is that Yamashita re-
stricts players to pure strategies and non-random mechanisms. This
is sensible for expositional reasons in his paper, but here we want
to illustrate formally how to handle randomization. One beneﬁt of
our approach is that it shows how principals can use recommendation
mechanisms to implement correlated actions.
The second diﬃculty has to do with private communication. What
agents ’recommend’ to principals in Yamashita’s game is a direct mech-
anism. In the course of the operation of this direct mechanism a princi-
pal communicates privately with each of this agents, which determines
the principal’s own action. We show how to tie these private commu-
nications together in such a way that principals can coordinate their
action choices.
2Finally, Yamashita limits commitment ability to a group of unin-
formed principals who deal with informed agents who have no commit-
ment power at all, and who make no direct choices beyond the messages
that they send to principals. We show how to extend his approach to
problems with informed principals and to situations in which all par-
ticipants have commitment power.
Our main result is a characterization of a set of outcome functions
that are supportable in his game. For complete information games, our
results show how the folk theorem like results in Kalai, Kalai, Lehrer,
and Samet (2010) can be extended to arbitrary numbers of players. For
games of incomplete information, we show that this set is eﬀectively
as large as the set of outcome functions supportable by a centralized
mechanism designer. We explain what we mean by ’eﬀectively’ below.
After presenting our formalism and results in the next few sections,
we return to discuss some of the shortcomings of the recommendation
game. In particular, we discuss the use of Bayesian equilibrium as a
solution concept, and explain why we cannot give a full characterization
of the set of outcome functions that can be supported as equilibrium
in this game.
1. Fundamentals
There are n ≥ 4 players. We sometimes write N to represent the
set of players. Player i must choose an action ai from a ﬁnite set Ai.




Each player i has a privately observed payoﬀ type θi drawn from a
ﬁnite set Θ. Payoﬀs are given by ui : A × Θn → R. Players have
expected utility preferences over actions.
Let Pi, P−i, and P be the set of probability distributions on Ai, A−i,
and A respectively. A typical element p ∈ P is a vector with pk equal
to the probability that the kth element in A occurs, where the set A is
indexed in some arbitrary fashion.
Let q : Θn → P be an allocation rule. In what follows we slightly
abuse notation by writing ui (q,θ) instead of
 
a∈A qaui (a,θ). We are
interested in allocation rules that are incentive compatible and individ-
ually rational. Incentive compatibility means
(1.1) E{ui (q (θ),θ)|θi} ≥ E{ui (q (θ
′
i,θ−i),θ)|θi}
for each i ∈ N, and θ′
i ∈ Θi. Individual rationality means that for each
player i there is a punishment pi : Θ−i → P−i such that for every θi













With complete information, an allocation is individually rational if and
only if it provides each player with an expected payoﬀ that exceeds his












Again, with complete information the punishment
p
∗








can be used to support all implementable allocations.
Notice that when constructing a punishment, or a minmax value,
punishers are allowed to correlate their punishments. This is appropri-
ate for a mechanism designer who can enforce contracts and correlate
actions among agents who have agreed to participate.
2. Recommendation Game
One of the things that makes competing mechanism games chal-
lenging is specifying exactly what message spaces and mechanisms are
feasible for players. Since our objective here is to study the implica-
tions of private communication, we use a very narrow interpretation of
what the set of feasible mechanisms is.
Let Γi be the set of all measurable mappings from (Θ × [0,1])
n(n−1) →
Ai. We are going to let the message space Mi for player i be Γi ×
(Θ × [0,1])
n. The set of mechanisms for player i is then going to be
the set of all measurable mappings Ri from (Mi)
n−1 into Ai. The game
then takes place in two stages. In the ﬁrst, players publicly announce
their mechanisms, in the second players privately send messages.
Let us explain. We are going to have each player i oﬀer a mecha-
nism that asks the other players to make a recommendation and report
types and correlating messages. Up to some qualiﬁcations that we
specify below, we describe equilibria in which each principal commits
himself to follow the other players’ recommendations provided they
all agree. Recommendations are mappings that look pretty much like
direct mechanisms, save for the additional correlating messages.
The complication we need to address is to ensure that the type report
(and correlating message) that another player provides is the same type
report that player sent to every third player. The way we are going to
deal with this is to have players send messages in (Θ × [0,1])
n over two
rounds. Each player will report his own type and correlating message
4in the ﬁrst round, then report the messages that he heard from the
other types on the second round.
As the process of reporting on reports means that our mechanisms
explicitly involve sequential communication, so we refer to them as
sequential communication mechanisms. It might also be noted at this
point that the mechanisms we allow are non-random. Every array of
messages leads to a pure action. We will induce randomization when
we allow agents to randomize over the messages they send in [0,1].
An equilibrium for the competing mechanism game is a Bayesian
equilibrium of the usual sort. The players’ strategies specify for each
of their types, a mechanism and a rule that speciﬁes the messages they
send in each round as a function of the mechanisms oﬀered by the other
players, and the messages they received in previous rounds. When we
need it, we use the notation Σi to refer to the set of strategy rules
available to player i. The notation σi refers to a speciﬁc strategy. A
Bayesian equilibrium is a collection of strategy rules that are jointly
best replies to one another.
3. Theorem
At this point we can state our main theorem:
Theorem 1. If there are 4 or more players, then an allocation rule can
be supported as a Bayesian equilibrium in the competing mechanism
game if it is incentive compatible and individually rational.
It is important to point out what this theorem adds to the logic
in Yamashita. Most obviously it covers random, and even correlated
outcomes that could not be captured because of the pure strategy non-
random mechanism assumptions in Yamashita. Secondly, it extends
the characterization from the uninformed principal informed agents
framework to an environment in which there are informed principals.
It covers common agency provided there are three or more principals,
which is ruled out by Yamashita’s approach. It also admits problems
in which bargaining power is evenly distributed among players. At
the most fundamental level, it provides a characterization in the form
of a set of inequalities, which Yamashita’s paper does not do, as we
explained above.
Of course, Yamashita’s point is not to provide a characterization in
the ﬁrst place. It is simply to show how recommendation mechanisms
work. Our model goes beyond this. We start with the set of incentive
5compatible individually rational allocation rules, then show how to
implement all of them.1
We now turn to the proof of this result which is completely construc-
tive.
4. Some Preliminary Ideas.
Our proof combines a number of ideas. We borrow methods from
computer science to implement correlated and random outcomes. We
then develop a sequential communication mechanism that eﬀectively
converts private communication into a public correlating device. We
explain each of these methods before we proceed to the proof of the
main theorem.
4.1. Implementing random outcomes with non-random con-
tracts. Let B be a set with K elements indexed in some arbitrary
way. Let π be a vector of K probabilities that sum to one. Let ˜ t be
a random variable uniformly distributed on [0,1]. The randomizing
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This randomizing function takes value bk with probability πk. To see
how this device will be used, suppose that player i can observe a ver-
iﬁable random device ˜ t which is uniformly distributed on [0,1]. Then
the contract απ  
˜ t,Ai
 
which maps from the randomizing device into
pure actions implements the mixture π on Ai. More broadly, απ  
˜ t,A
 






projection of α onto Ai. If each player writes a contract based on ˜ t
















implements the joint randomization π.
4.2. A property of uniform distributions. For any non-negative
real number x, ⌊x⌋ means the fractional part of x (sometimes the ter-
minology is x mod 1). Let ˜ x1,..., ˜ xn be a collection of n independent
random variables, where each ˜ xi is uniformly distributed on [0,1]. For
n ≥ 2, ﬁx ˜ xi = x for some i. Then ⌊x+
 
j =i ˜ xj⌋ is a random variable.
This random variable turns out to be uniformly distributed on [0,1]
1Even if we don’t know what these allocation rules are, it seems a far easier
problem to calculate them for some environment than it does to ﬁnd all mechanisms
which have pure strategy continuation equilibrium.
6independent of ¯ x. 2 Since this argument proves very useful below, we
give a simple proof in the Appendix section 8.1..
4.3. Conﬁrmation Process. Now we describe how we will turn pri-
vate messages into public messages. There are two issues here - the
ﬁrst is to create what amounts to a public correlating device. Perhaps
as important, each player will convey type information to the other
players. Since the player’s type report must be the same in each mech-
anism to which he reports, we have to provide some kind of incentive
for players to say the same thing to all players. We do this using a
special sequential communication mechanism that we call a ’conﬁrma-
tion process’. Players send messages in the ﬁrst round, but commit
themselves to react only when other players conﬁrm these messages in
the second round.
Recall that in our mechanisms, a player expects to receive a mes-
sage in (Θ × [0,1])
n from each of the other players along with some
recommendation about how to deal with these messages. The rec-
ommendation is a mapping γi : (Θ × [0,1])
n(n−1) → Ai suggesting to
player i how he should convert the messages in (Θ × [0,1]) into actions.
As they aren’t mechanisms per se, we will refer to the mappings γi as
processes. To simplify notation a bit, deﬁne S ≡ (Θ × [0,1]). Let τ be
a mapping from Sn(n−1) → Sn.
Now adopt the following notation: let sj represent the ﬁrst round
message that player i receives from player j. Let tk
j represent the second
round report that player j makes to i about player k’s ﬁrst round report.
Observe that the message ti
j would be j’s report about what i told him
in the ﬁrst round. This message is important in what follows despite
the fact that i already knows what report he made to j in the ﬁrst
round. Player i’s mechanism will deal with n − 1 reports like this and
convert them into a single vector in Sn.
Deﬁnition 2. The mapping γi : Sn(n−1) → Ai is called a conﬁrmation
process for player i if there is a mapping τ : Sn(n−1) → Sn and a
mapping γτ
i : Sn → Ai such that γi (˜ s) = γτ
i (τ (˜ s)) for every ˜ s ∈
Sn(n−1), and such that the jth component of this transformation τ is
given by
τj (s−i,t−i) =
2This appears to be conventional wisdom in statistics. The theorem is referred to
in Deng and E.Olusegun (1990). A proof that the sum mod 1 of a pair of random
variables on [0,1] is uniform as long as at least one of the random variables is
uniform is given in Deng, Lin, Wang, and Yuan (1997), Theorem 3.1 (see especially





s′ if j = i;
 
∃!j′ : ti
j′  = ti
k ≡ s′∀k  = j′,i
 
∨ {ti
k = s′∀k  = i}








∃!k  = i,j : t
j
k  = sj = s′ 
s otherwise.
In the expression above, the notation ∃! means there ’exists a unique...’,
the notation ∨ stands for ’or’.
We explain. A conﬁrmation process breaks the mapping γi into two
parts. One part, the γτ
i looks much like an inscrutable direct mechanism
in which the action the player takes is a function of the types of his
agents as well as his own type. His ’agents’ in this case, are just the
other players. However, he doesn’t simply ask the others to report
their types or choose his own type. Instead, he derives these types
from a larger set of messages. This is the ’conﬁrmation’ part τ, which
reduces the n(n − 1) messages sent over two rounds into the n messages
required by γτ
i .
The number τj (s−i,t−i) is the type (and correlating message) in S
that i will use for player j in the ’direct mechanism’ γτ
i . First consider
how player i derives the type that he uses for himself - i.e., the value
τi. The logic is described in the ﬁrst line of (4.2). He asks the others to
tell him what type he reported to them in the ﬁrst round. If they all
agree, or all but one of them agrees he uses whatever type they agree
on. Otherwise, he uses some arbitrary type.
For the others, the computation diﬀers only slightly - the logic is
described in the second line of (4.2). To ﬁnd a type (and correlating
message) for player j, he asks the players other than j what type j
reported to them in the ﬁrst round. If they all agree, he uses that type.
If there is a single dissenting message, he compares the messages that
do agree with the type that j reported to him on the ﬁrst round. If
those agree, then he uses that type. Otherwise, he uses an arbitrary
type.
We give more structure to the processes γi below. For the moment,
we focus on a very speciﬁc property of conﬁrmation processes. Fix
an array of mechanisms for the players. Every such array of mecha-
nisms indexes a subgame of the original game in which players send
recommendations and reports. Generally players don’t know what rec-
ommendations other players make to each other, so they can’t predict
exactly how their reports in Sn are being converted into actions by any
other player.
However, if we ﬁx a set of strategy rules, then each player j believes
that the relationship between reports and actions for player i is given
by some mapping ˜ γ
j
i : Sn(n−1) → Pi. This mapping depends on j’s
type, though we suppress this in the notation to make it a bit simpler.
8Implicit in this mapping is a presumption that j follows the strategy
σj when he makes his recommendation to i.
In many subgames, this uncertainty will disappear. For example,
if player i uses a mechanism which makes his action independent of
players’ recommendations. The case we are interested in here is one in
which the strategy rules that players are using are such that player j
knows what recommendations the others will make to player i. Given
some subgame and some array of strategy rules, we say that player j
believes that player i is using process γj if ˜ γi
j = γj.3
Lemma 3. Suppose n ≥ 4. Consider any subgame and set of strategy
rules such that some player j believes that player i is using a conﬁr-
mation process. Suppose further that all the players other than j are
using strategy rules that involve a consistent revelation strategy. Then
whatever the realizations (s−j,t−j) of the others’ reports, τi
k (s−i,t−i) is
independent of what j reports if k  = j, while there are reports that j
can send to i such that τi
j (s−j,t−j) takes any value in S.
The important thing about this Lemma is that when j considers
what messages to send to player i, he is strategically in exactly the same
position he would be in participating in a standard direct mechanism.
All he can aﬀect is his type report (and correlating message) to player
i.
We give a full proof here, but the logic is straightforward. There are
4 or more players, so i expects messages from at least three players. By
(4.2) i will ignore a message from one player unless it agrees with all
the others. When player j is considering what value player i will use
for the type and correlating message of some player k, he expects the
other players to report a common value in S to i as they are all using
consistent reporting strategies. As a consequence, he expects his own
message will be ignored. Observe that this logic applies to both the
ﬁrst and second round message. Also note that player i is also expected
to use a consistent reporting strategy here, so k could have the value i
in this paragraph.
On the other hand, if j considers what message i will use for him, the
logic is diﬀerent. As the others are using consistent reporting strategies,
he simply needs to send the same message in S to each of the other
players to ensure that i uses that message. None of this argument
works if n is three or less because i cannot tell which of two diﬀerent
messages he should ignore.
3Equality here means that the mixture on the left is a degenerate mixture with
support that coincides with the values on the right hand side.
94.4. Consensus Mechanisms. The idea that principals should ask
their agents for recommendations about how to process information is
due to Yamashita (2010). His idea was to have the principal commit
himself to carry out the recommendations of the agents provided an
outright majority of the agents make the same recommendation. We
simply adapt this idea here. In our context there may or may not
be agents, so players ask other players for recommendations. If the
principal’s mechanism commits him to carry out the recommendation
when all the other players, or all but one of the other players agree,
then we say that the principal’s mechanisms is a consensus mechanism.
Formally, a mechanism ri : (Γi)




γ′ (s−i) if {∃!j : γj  = γk ≡ γ′∀k  = j} ∨ {γk = γj ≡ γ′∀j,k}
ai otherwise.
Now the proof of our folk theorem can be done constructively. On
our equilibrium path all players will oﬀer a consensus mechanism in-
dependent of their type. If all players do this, then each of them will
recommend a conﬁrmation process to each of the other players. The
details of the conﬁrmation process will depend on the allocation rule
we are trying to support. If some player deviates and oﬀers something
other than a consensus mechanism, then the other players will recom-
mend to each other a conﬁrmation process than penalizes the deviator.
It should be apparent why this construction will work. Players can
see whether or not everyone has oﬀered a conﬁrmation process after
mechanisms are announced. They then believe that they know what
recommendations the others will make. The nature of a consensus pro-
cess is such that unilateral disagreement is ignored, so going along with
the majority is at least a weak best reply. The conﬁrmation process has
been constructed speciﬁcally so that all players can accomplish when
they participate is to report one common type to all the others. As
long as the conﬁrmation process implements an incentive compatible
allocation rule, it is a best reply for each player to report this type
truthfully. The only real complication in the proof is to show that it is
an equilibrium for players to send correlating messages that correctly
implement randomized outcomes.
105. The Proof of the Main Theorem
Proof. The proof is constructive. Let q (θ) be the randomization that
is to be supported when types are θ. Since the allocation rule is in-
dividually rational, there is a collection of punishments that ensure
participation by each player. Let {pi (θ−i)}i∈N be the type contingent
randomization that is to be carried out by the players other than i
when i is being punished.
We ﬁrst describe the recommendations we want players to make.
Let τ be a conﬁrmation process with message space Sn = (Θ × [0,1])
n.
Write (θ,x) as a typical element of S. The function τj (s−i,t−i) ∈







rium path recommendation by other players to player i is given by


















on the set A onto the set Ai. The randomizing function
is deﬁned by (4.1) above.
When player k unilaterally deviates in the mechanism design stage















to each non-deviating player i, where (s−ik,t−ik) is an array of messages
from the other non-deviating players. In words, the non-deviators will
recommend to each other the (projection of the) randomizing function
associated with the punishment.
In any information set in which all players have oﬀered a consen-
sus mechanism, player i should recommend γj to each other player j,
truthfully report to each player k  = j the message received from player
j, truthfully report his type to every other player, and send every other
player a correlating message x drawn uniformly from [0,1]. In any his-
tory in which a single player, say player k, has deviated and oﬀered
some mechanism other than a consensus mechanism, player i should
recommend the punishment mechanism γk
j to each player j  = k, truth-
fully report the private message received from each player j  = k to each
player j′  = k,j, send the same correlating message s′ to each of the
other players where s′ is chosen using a uniform distribution on [0,1],
11and report his type truthfully to each of the players other than k. Any
action unspeciﬁed here can be chosen arbitrarily.
Now we proceed to prove that the strategies speciﬁed constitute a
Bayesian equilibrium. First, it is immediately a best reply for each
player to oﬀer a consensus mechanism. If he does that, he should
expect the allocation rule q (θ). If he deviates, he should expect the
others to implement the punishment pi (θ). Since the allocation rule
satisﬁes (1.2), this can’t increase his payoﬀ.4
On the equilibrium path, all players oﬀer consensus mechanisms, and
each player recommends a conﬁrmation processγj as given by (5.1). We
have already explained that for any conﬁrmation process, it is a best
reply for each player to report the same type and correlating message
to each of the other players provided they believe that the others are
doing the same. For the correlating message, the others are expected
to send a correlating message that is uniformly distributed on [0,1].




has a uniform distribution independent of what signal xi i chooses to
send. Then for each θ−i and each report θ′
i and signal ˜ xi that i chooses

















where ˜ x has a uniform distribution on [0,1]. Since this rule implements
the incentive compatible rule q, player i has no incentive to misrepresent
his type. It is also a best reply for player i to choose a signal uniformly
from [0,1]. ￿
6. Remarks.
The approach above shares many of the methods of the literature on
communication in gamesGerardi (2004),Forges (1986),Barany (1992).
Gerardi (2004), for example, uses the majority rule approach to ensure
that players all send the ’correct’ message in his communication proto-
cols. This is exactly the idea behind a consensus mechanism. He also
uses the randomization idea in (4.1), albeit restricted to two players.5
The important diﬀerence between our paper and all this literature is
4Notice that because we are only interested in Bayesian equilibrium at this point,
this particular argument works even if there are only three players in the game. We
still need the fourth player to support equilibrium in the conﬁrmation process.
5He has two players publicly announce numbers in the interval [0,1] then uses
the fractional part as a public correlating device. As there are only two players,
12the fact that we are doing mechanism design - players can make com-
mitments based on messages. So the allocation rules we support aren’t
typically communication equilibrium (or correlated equilibrium with
complete information).
As an example, consider a prisoner’s dilemma played between two
players 1 and 2. To make the environment ﬁt our settings, add two
disinterested players 3 and 4 who take no actions of their own. The
actions are C for cooperate and D for defect. The only communication
equilibrium in this game has both players A and B playing D, since
the action C is striclty dominated. The outcome where both 1 and
2 play C can be supported as an equilibrium with recommendation
mechanisms. A recommendation mechanism commits the player to
the action the other three players recommend provided 2 of the three
recommendations agree. To keep things simple, suppose the only other
mechanisms that players are allowed to oﬀer are the ones that ignore
all messages and commit to either C or D. The strategies are for each
player 1 and 2 to oﬀer a recommendation mechanism then recommend
C if the other player oﬀers a recommendation mechanism, Players 3
and 4 recommend C if 1 and 2 both oﬀer recommendation mechanisms,
and recommend D if one player oﬀers a recommendation mechanism
and the other doesn’t. It should be apparent in this construction that
deviating from this equilibrium changes the action of the other player
from C to D. So these strategies constitute an equilibrium.
What is important in this exercise is that players 1 and 2 have a
way to commit themselves to an action which can never be part of a
communication equilibium.
There is a literature on mechanism design in communication net-
works (J. Renault and Tomala (2010) or Renou and Tomala (2010))
which considers sequential communication schemes like the one we de-
scribed in Section 4.3. In this literature, a centralized mechanism de-
signer can communicate with only a subset of all the agents. However,
the agents can communicate among themselves according to some ex-
ogenously ﬁxed communication protocol. The papers cited above pro-
vide communication protocols which allow agents to communicate their
type information secretly to the principal. The essence of their result
is to show that, provided the communications network is right, there
is a way for agents to encode their own information along with the
information they have received from others, and pass it along in such
a way that only the the mechanism designer can decode it.
he doesn’t need our Remark 4. In our model, there are no public messages at all,
beyond the mechanisms that players announce at the beginning of the game.
13In order to ensure that players pass along encoded information truth-
fully, their papers use a method that resembles our conﬁrmation pro-
cess. A protocol that transmits player 1’s type (assumed here to be a
positive number) to the mechanism designer is repeated, say, 3 times.
Player 1 chooses at random one of the three repetitions and transmits
his type on that repetition. On each of the other two repetitions he
transmits the number 0 as his type. If the mechanism designer decodes
2 zeros and one positive number, he responds as if the type is a positive
number. If he decodes any other sequence, he implements a punish-
ment. The purpose of this is to ensure that the other players transmit
messages from player 1 truthfully. They don’t know which of the three
messages from player 1 contain his type report. So they have a 1 in
three chance of changing the outcome in a way that they might like,
and a 2/3 chance of inducing the punishment when they lie. Assuming
that there is a punishment that is strictly worse than any outcome the
mechanism designer might otherwise implement, no matter the type of
any other player, then repeating the protocol enough times will ensure
that players other than player 1 transmit messages truthfully.
The details of the argument diﬀer, but the spirit is the same as the
conﬁrmation process - if other players are hearing the same message
that you are, then there are sometimes ways to to check whether they
are transmitting the information truthfully. Our communication pro-
cess is structured to do this, so we don’t need a ’worst outcome’ that a
mechanism designer can use to enforce truthtelling. In our framework,
deviating messages are simply ignored. Of course, the context of our
result is quite diﬀerent since we don’t have a mechanism designer in
the ﬁrst place - we deal with decentralized competition.
Nonetheless, the method they describe illustrates how the results pre-
sented here might be extended to games with fewer than four players.
Our communication mechanism requires agreement among all but one
of the players who are participating in a mechanism. If there are only
two players, and the messages they send are diﬀerent, then the player
who is interpreting them does not know which message is the correct
one, and which is a deviation. Each of our players has to have at least
three others sending him messages for our method to work. The method
above illustrates how a player might detect deviations with messages
from only two players provided the sequential communication mecha-
nism goes on for long enough. It may also be possible to extend our
results if there is a public correlating device using methods like those
in Forges and Vida (2011) who show that communications equilibrium
outcomes can be implemented with long cheap talk in games with only
two players using a public device.
14The use of a second round of communication to provide a mecha-
nism designer with additional information is similar to the argument
in Mezzetti (2004), who shows how a mechanism designer can improve
outcomes by using a second round of information in which players pro-
vide information about their values. When players’ payoﬀs are interde-
pendent, each player’s value contains information about everyone else’s
type in much the same way the ﬁrst round reports do here. Of course,
the method we use to get players to reveal this information is quite
diﬀerent than it is in that reference.
Folk theorem like results for competing mechanism games have been
provided by Tennenholtz (2004), Kalai, Kalai, Lehrer, and Samet (2010)
and Peters and Szentes (2012). The essential diﬀerence between these
papers and our result here is that they assume contracts condition
directly on the contracts of other players. The paper by Peters and
Szentes (2012) deals with incomplete information games. It fully char-
acterizes the outcome functions that can be supported as contract equi-
librium. However, it assumes that players never communicate privately.
Any type information that a player wants to convey must be publicly
conveyed through his contract oﬀer. This can limit the eﬀectiveness
of punishments since a deviating player will inevitably know the types
of the other players when he deviates. It is diﬃcult to give a formal
description of the diﬀerence between the two papers because Peters
and Szentes (2012) rule out randomization. To illustrate the relation-
ship between the outcome function and the information that a deviator
would then have during the punishment phase, we would need to deve-
lope considerable additional formalism. Roughly speaking, their char-
acterization provides an individual rationality constraint that looks like
1.2 except for the fact that the deviator’s beliefs when he chooses his
best action would depend on the types of the punishing players. They
provide an example of an outcome function that is supportable in the
sense described here, which cannot be supported as an equilibrium in
their game because of the fact that ﬁrms equilibrium contract oﬀers
leak information about their types. So the set of outcome functions
supportable as Bayesian equilibrium in the Peters and Szentes (2012)
model is strictly smaller than the set supported here.
The paper by Peters (2010) provides a characterization of outcome
functions supportable as Bayesian equilibrium in regular contracting
games. Along with the characterization it provides a contracting game
in which these outcomes can be supported as perfect Bayesian equi-
librium. In fact it borrows the correlating device we have, in turn,
borrowed here. However, the point of that paper is quite diﬀerent. It
15revisits the question in Epstein and Peters (1999) and provides a mod-
iﬁed set of direct mechanisms that can be used to mimic equilibrium
outcomes in any competing mechanism game - eﬀectively providing a
revelation principle for competing mechanisms.
The set of outcome functions supported here is a subset of the set
supported in Peters (2010). The reciprocal contracting game described
in Peters (2010) supports more outcomes because it adds a cheap talk
stage to the game that isn’t present in Yamashita’s game. The makes it
possible to support some punishments in which the deviating player’s
action depends on the punishing players’ types (which is impossible
in the framework here). Enlarging the set of possible punishments
enlarges the set of outcome functions that can be supported in equilib-
rium.
It would be possible to modify Yamashita’s game (adding cheap talk
and proceeding exactly as in Peters (2010)) so that all the outcomes
described in Peters (2010) could also be supported. However, there is
little point in doing so. The full set of outcome functions supportable
in Yamashita’s game is unknown for reasons we explain in the next
section. Our theorem above does not provide a full characterization of
supportable outcomes.
7. Bayesian Equilibrium
Our theorem uses Bayesian equilibrium as a solution concept. Be-
yond saying that reﬁned equilibrium will impose additional restric-
tions, not much can be said about perfect Bayesian equilibrium in
Yamashita’s game.
To understand the biggest problem with reﬁnements, consider a game
with complete information. There are four players (simply so that the
assumptions of our theorem above are satisﬁed). Suppose that player 1
has three possible actions, {a,b,c}. None of the other players controls
any actions at all. Player 1 oﬀers a mechanism, and the solution concept
requires that after seeing the mechanism, continuation play constitutes
a Nash equilibrium (subgame perfection). Obviously, player 1 sim-
ply chooses his favorite action in any Bayesian equilibrium. However,
player 1 could deviate and oﬀer a mechanism which invites players 2
and 3 to send a message in [0,1]. He commits to translate the messages





a if m2 < m3 < m2 + 1
2,




16Now imagine payoﬀs for player 2 areu(a) = −1, u(b) = 0, and u(c) =
1. Player 3’s payoﬀ is −u. This is simply the Sion Wolfe Sion and
Wolfe (1957) example of a game that has no equilibrium in either pure
or mixed strategies. This is a feasible mechanism in our framework, and
a reasonable looking mechanism in any framework. So in this simple
setting, there can be no subgame perfect equilibrium to the mechanism
game unless mechanisms like the one above are ruled out.
One approach is to restrict the set of mechanisms that players are al-
lowed to recommend to principals (by requiring that mechanisms only
use ﬁnite message spaces for example so that continuation equilibrium
always exists). An alternative approach would be to use a reﬁnement
other than subgame perfection.6 For example, Peters and Szentes
(2012) suggest a reﬁnement that looks more like sequential rational-
izability. Either approach would impose additional restrictions on the
punishments.
There is little point in trying to develop these approaches, because
recommendation games suﬀer from another diﬃculty, even when the
solution concept is Bayesian equilibrium. The issue is that agents see
what contract a deviator has oﬀered before they make a recommenda-
tion about how to punish. As we have modelled the game here, a mech-
anism oﬀered by a deviator must specify an action. As a consequence,
Yamashita’s game is not regular as deﬁned in Peters (2010), since the
players who are punishing the deviator can make their actions depend
on what action the deviator commits to play. Punishments could then
have a kind of maxmin property.
This seems an undesirable property of a competing mechanism game
because it is eﬀectively eliminating an option that is available to players
in the default game. To put it another way, adding a contracting pro-
cess that involves recommendation mechanisms amounts to changing
the economic environment in which players interact.
This is not such a big problem in games of complete information
since there is no diﬀerence between minmax and maxmin. However in
the incomplete information environments discussed here, it just isn’t
clear what the implication of this change in the economic environment
will be. Indeed, the whole idea of ’punishing’ a deviator with an incen-
tive compatible (or incentive rationalizable) punishment breaks down
in Yamashita’s game. Whether a punishment is incentive compatible
or not is going to depend on what the deviator chooses to commit
to. A full characterization of equilibrium would then require writing
6Sequential equilibrium is not well suited to the game discussed here because the
messages spaces aren’t ﬁnite.
17down a list of punishment not only for every deviator, but for every
commitment the deviatior might make.
The implication of all this is that there are outcomes supported as
Bayesian equilibrium in Yamashita’s game, that cannot be supported
with reciprocal contracting as in Peters (2010). Indeed there must be
outcomes that could not even be supported by a centralized mechanism
designer who is constrained to select punishments as they are usually
described. It is just very diﬃcult to understand what these outcome
functions would look like.
Conclusion
Our basic contribution is to show that a large set of outcomes can be
supported as equilibrium in Yamashita’s recommendation game. The
methods used to support randomization, and to coordinate the infor-
mation available to the players should be useful in other contexts.
8. Appendix
8.1. Uniform Distributions and independence.
Remark 4. ⌊x +
 
j =i ˜ xj⌋ is uniformly distributed on [0,1] indepen-
dently of ¯ x provides each ˜ xj is uniformly distributed on [0,1].
Proof. Suppose that n = 2. Then
 
j =i ˜ xj = ˜ xj, and ⌊¯ x + ˜ xj⌋ is
obviously uniform. Let both ˜ x1 and ˜ x2 be uniform on [0,1]. Then the
probability density function of ˜ z = ˜ x1 + ˜ x2 is7
f (z) =
 
z 0 ≤ z ≤ 1
2 − x otherwise.






(2 − z)dz = w.
So ⌊˜ x1 + ˜ x2⌋ is uniformly distributed. So when n = 3, ⌊¯ x+
 
j =i ˜ xj⌋ is
uniformly distributed. Then the argument follows by induction. If for
n−1 players ⌊¯ x+
 
k =j ˜ xk⌋ is uniformly distributed, then for n players









18and uniformity follows from the result for n = 3. ￿
8.2. Proof of Lemma 3.
Lemma 5. Suppose n ≥ 4. Consider any subgame and set of strategy
rules such that some player j believes that player i is using a conﬁr-
mation process. Suppose further that all the players other than j are
using strategy rules that involve a consistent revelation strategy. Then
whatever the realizations (s−j,t−j) of the others’ reports, τi
k (s−i,t−i) is
independent of what j reports if k  = j, while there are reports that j
can send to i such that τi
j (s−j,t−j) takes any value in S.
Proof. Fix the ﬁrst round reports s−j of the players other than j. We
write in the obvious way s−jk for the subvector consisting of reports
in s−j by players other than k. Suppose that j’s strategy is consistent
and he sends the message s′ to each of the other players in the ﬁrst
round. Then since every other player is using a consistent strategy,
the value that i uses for player j will be based on ﬁrst round messages
(s′,s−ij), second round message (s′,s−kj) from each player k  = j since
each such player is using a consistent reporting strategy, and second
round message s−j from player j which doesn’t depend on s′. Since the
ﬁrst round message from player j agrees with the second round reports














Notice that this veriﬁes the last part of the theorem - j can induce any
value for τi
j in S.
Player j can deviate from this consistent strategy by sending diﬀerent
messages to the other players on the ﬁrst round. He could also send
diﬀerent messages to i on the second round, but τi
j doesn’t depend on
i’s second round messages, so we defer discussion of this second kind
of deviation. Let sk be the message he sends to player k on the ﬁrst
round, and ˜ s−j the vector of n−1 messages he sends to i on the second
round. In this case there are two possibilities. If the players k  = j all
report s′


















19which is an outcome j could have obtained by using a consistent report-















which is an outcome he could also accomplish with a consistent strategy
by sending the message s to each player then reporting accurately to i
in the second round.
To complete the proof of the theorem, observe that since player k is
using a consistent reporting strategy, he will make the same ﬁrst round
report sk to each of the other players. With the possible exception of
player j, each of the others will then report sk to player i. Since at
















independent of ˜ s−j. ￿
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